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How do regional organisations handle the problem of Western-designated ‘pariah’ states?  
The pressure brought to bear by the United States and the European Union (EU) on regional 
organisations to play a key role in transforming the domestic politics of member states is 
becoming a perennial feature of contemporary international relations.  Informing this 
conflictual dynamic is an assumption that regional organisations are best placed due to their 
proximity, local knowledge and interlocking interests with the affected ‘pariah’ state to act 
judiciously in managing the delicate diplomacy of political change.  Moreover, with regional 
organisations in areas as far removed as Southern Africa and Southeast Asia overtly 
committed to democratic norms like democracy, expectations that they are able to perform the 
determining role as implementing agents of change have been high. 
 
In fact, regional organisations in the developing world have not proven to be effective 
intermediaries or instruments for promoting compliance with progressive norms within the 
global structures of governance.   From a Western perspective, regional organisations have 
served primarily as buffers against internationally-inspired action by providing diplomatic 
and economic and resistance to ‘outside interference’, be it mandated through the UN 
Security Council or elsewhere.  Prime examples of this phenomenon are Zimbabwe and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Myanmar and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), both of which have featured recalcitrant authoritarian 
regimes and practices that, while subjected to diplomatic campaigns and economic sanctions 
by the West, have sought – and gained – active support from their respective regional 
organisations.  At the same time, within the confines of established regional practice, a close 
examination of regional organisations and their member states demonstrates that actions were 
taken to censure the regimes in Zimbabwe and Myanmar. Why this has been the case and how 
regional organisations have attempted to respond to contradictory mandates from 
international, regional and domestic sources forms the focus of this investigation.  
 
This paper examines the role of regional organisations as interlocutors between the putatively 
universal liberal norms promoted by extra-regional actors and the communities of practice 
adopted by two regional organisations, namely, SADC and ASEAN.  In particular, it will 
investigate the dilemmas posed by Western-designated pariah regimes for said regional 
organisations and the processes by which these organisations seek to address this problematic. 
It will focus on the relationship between multilateral institutions as instigators of liberal 
norms as sources of regime legitimacy; regional organisations as interpreters of these norms; 
and the interplay between the local (pariah regimes and civil society in these states) and these 
aforementioned entities. 
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Regional Organisations and International Security 
The role of regional organisations as interlocutors between the international community and 
the local environment has become a well-established principle in international law based on 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.1 Article 52(3), for example, allows for a leading role in the 
resolution of international disputes at the regional level at the behest of the Security Council. 
Indeed, the UN Secretary General’s blueprint for post-Cold War security management, An 
Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 63-4), explicitly builds on this by endorsing the idea 
that: 
‘…undertakings by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional 
action which can also contribute to the maintenance of peace and security…’ 
He goes on to note: 
‘In the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a 
universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion 
work at cross-purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effectiveness 
of the world Organisation.  But in this new ear of opportunity, regional 
arrangements or agencies can render great service if their actions are taken in a 
manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their 
relationship with the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, is 
governed by Chapter VIII.’  
This notion of an enhanced role for regional organisations in the security arena linked to 
‘burden sharing’ was further supported by the Report of the Commission on Global 
Governance (1995: 50-1) and, with respect to peacekeeping, the Brahimi Report (United 
Nations 2000). 
 
This position of regional organisations as a bridge between the international and its values, 
processes and institutions is seen by many to be the foundation for emerging structures of 
global governance (Falk 1999: 241-2; Knight 2000: 176-9). That being said, there is great 
variation in development of formalised procedures and the attendant strength of regional 
institutions as sites of negotiation and enforcement of international regimes.  For instance, 
while the standing of regional organisations within the global trading environment is clearly 
drawn, built around the principle of ‘most-favoured nation status’ and codified through 
practices derived from legal provisions such as Article 24 in the WTO treaty and its dispute-
resolution mechanism, regional organisations’ security provisions are much less well-
articulated.  
 
Security arrangements rely upon the twin notions of ‘collective security’ and ‘subsidiarity’ in 
peace enforcement and peacekeeping, concepts underwritten by the fact that all member states 
of the UN are obliged to fulfil responsibilities as signatories of the Charter (UN 1945; Falk 
1999: 241; Knight 2000: 170-2).  These efforts nonetheless have a much more chequered 
history of application and adherence by member states than trade issues, while there is only 
selective use of the International Court of Justice to resolve conflicts. This uneven landscape 
within a hierarchical structure of governance, dependent upon the substantive levels of 
acceptance of prevailing norms in economic and security issues at the regional and local 
levels that go beyond formal acceptance at the international level, contributes to uncertainty 
in perception and ultimately practice in realising international security aims. 
                                                 
1 The term used in the Charter is ‘regional arrangements’, but this is today commonly understood to include 
regional organisations (Gareis and Varwick 2005: 87 
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A major oversight in assessments of regional organisations within the framework of global 
governance and security is their position towards internationally-designated ‘pariah regimes’.  
The act of legitimising and de-legitimising political regimes is absolutely crucial to promoting 
effective governance of the global system in line with the norms found in the UN Charter and 
operationalised through the positions adopted, for instance, by the UN Security Council or 
UN General Assembly. In terms of Chapter VIII, regional organisations, as intermediaries 
between the international and the local, are presumed by policy makers and scholars to 
enforce rules and processes defined at the global level (UN 1945; Boutros-Ghali 1995; Knight 
2000; Graham and Felicio 2005; Mills 2005). These notions are by and large built upon the 
approach and experience of the EU.  In fact, experience has shown that regional organisations 
are as often resistant to international entreaties as they are compliant, actively seeking to 
thwart or redefine these in line with local perceptions. Apartheid South Africa, which had 
tacit support for domestic segregation policies from the Western-dominated UN Security 
Council up to the 1980s, failed to win regional support either from the Organisation for 
African Unity, the Frontline States group or even for its own stillborn regional organisation, 
the Constellation of Southern African States.2 African regional resistance to the 
acknowledgment and enforcement of international positions (played out in the UN General 
Assembly but operationalised on the continent) proved to be critical to de-legitimising the 
apartheid regime in favour of anti-apartheid non-state actors, most especially the African 
National Congress (ANC), as well as redefining the principle of non-intervention in domestic 
affairs. 
 
As the precise modalities of the expected role of regional organisations are not clearly spelled 
out in the UN Charter and actual practice by regional organisations has not provided a 
consistent guide to understanding the nature of this relationship, there remains considerable 
ambiguity in assessing this phenomenon.  Neither does the theoretical literature on the subject 
provide much insight into regional approaches to global governance, especially given the 
limited number of comparative studies of regional organisations and security issues.3  
Moreover, with the bulk of global security issues increasingly found in the developing 
countries of the South – where failed states vie with aspirant nuclear powers for international 
attention – the stance taken by regional organisations is recognised to be crucial.  In this 
context, it seems that the most important factors that impact upon this international-regional-
local dynamic in the realm of security are:  
 
a) Multilateral institutions that seek to define global security norms and concerns and 
promulgate policies in line with these concerns;  
b) Regional organisations as sites of interpretation of these international norms and their 
‘localisation’ in line with prevailing regional and local norms;  
c) The local environment as the source of insecurity itself, the actors engaged in the issue 
and an organisational arena for addressing the security concern.   
 
Underlying this schema is a set of assumptions regarding the hierarchical character of norms 
diffusion as well as the linear nature of the process of policy implementation. The role of 
local actors, especially though not exclusively states within the region, as arbitrators of 
external ideas and process, is clearly central. As Acharya (2004) demonstrates in his work on 
                                                 
2 The latter in fact inspired the creation of a ‘counter’ regional formation, the Southern African Development Co-
ordination Conference in 1980. 
3 This is changing, for instance see Wulf 2009. 
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norm localisation, it is local agents who act as interpreters and implementers of ‘external’ 
ideas and policies, rendering them understandable and even palatable in local terms, or 
outright rejecting their incorporation into the local political landscape.  It is a process that can 
significantly alter the content of the ideas and policies from ‘outside’. The parallel with 
regional organisations in relation to the international community – especially Western states 
that have elaborated an increasingly significant legal departure from classic definitions of 
sovereignty through such doctrines as the ‘responsibility to protect’ – is relevant.  Within the 
context of multilateral institutions and regional organisations it must be acknowledged that it 
is states that delineate and contest the concept of ‘global security’ in terms of their respective 
interests. The state’s ability to interpret externally-generated norms and policy prescriptions 
in ways that conform to regional norms and practices – and crucially are in tune with their 
own interests – determines the scope of action available on a given issue.  Even in those cases 
where great powers, whether legitimated or not by international institutions, employ their own 
means to tackle a particular threat (as was the case in Iraq in 2003), the capacity for 
generating successful and sustainable outcomes remains crucially dependent on local and 
regional factors. Capturing this dynamic between states and regional organisations is critical 
to understanding processes and outcomes of decisions made to respond to designated threats 
to global security. 
 
Comparing the cases of SADC in relation to Zimbabwe and ASEAN in relation to Myanmar 
provides important insights into the dilemmas and dynamics posed by Western-designated 
pariahs.  In defining the security concern in these regions, Western countries in particular 
have focused on sources of political regime legitimacy that privilege both process – elections 
that the governing parties have lost or nullified – and local (opposition) actors as the key 
factors in determining their decision to characterise these states as pariahs and call for policies 
that isolate their governments. Regional organisations have emphasised the sanctity of state 
sovereignty and the rule of non-interference in Zimbabwe (Schoeman and Alden 2003) and 
Myanmar (Ramcharan 2000), as well as the role of initiatives that are said to conform to 
regional norms (‘quiet diplomacy’ and ‘ASEAN way’) and therefore are in their view likely 
to be more effective.  This active resistance on the part of SADC and ASEAN to the range of 
Western-led efforts to delegitimise the political regimes in Harare and Yangon – including 
diplomatic and economic sanctions campaigns – has resulted in a stalemate that has not 
resolved these underlying security concerns. This was despite the fact that key states within 
the regional organisations actively attempted to bring about a change in conduct by the 
internationally-designated pariahs so as to facilitate a resolution acceptable to local and 
international actors.  Despite this, the continuing deterioration of conditions within these 
countries, coming atop sustained human rights violations, only served to underscore the dire 
consequences of public inaction and the concomitant failure of regional approaches to 
effectively manage and resolve security dilemmas in their respective regions.   
 
 
SADC and Zimbabwe 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formally established in 1992, 
though its origins reside in the regional politics of resistance to apartheid and colonialism. 
The creation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference in April 1980 – 
partially in response to the apartheid government’s own regional initiative and actively 
supported by Western European governments– with its explicit mandate to reduce its 
members’ economic dependency upon South Africa, reflected the regional ethos of solidarity 
with liberation aims and the incoming leadership of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe.  By 1992, 
with the negotiations towards a democratic transition well underway in South Africa, the 
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organisation recast its aims to embark on a deeper developmental agenda, bolster regional 
security and commit itself to supporting democracy and human rights amongst members. 
With all member states constitutional democracies, except Swaziland and the war-torn 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Angola having returned to civil war in the wake of the 
disputed 1991 elections), the conditions for SADC fostering greater economic prosperity 
while encouraging adherence to democratic principles seemed brighter than ever.  Moreover, 
from the perspective of the US and the EU, by incorporating newly democratic South Africa 
within the organisational structures in 1994, SADC coupled the region’s strongest economy, 
military and bureaucracy to the fulfilment of these ambitions (Lyman 1996). 
 
The onset of the Zimbabwean crisis in 2000, though rooted in the transitional arrangements 
that effectively froze the political economy of settler colonialism through constitutional 
means at the same time that it opened up the political system to democratic pluralism led by a 
liberation party, had its contemporary expression in the rising tide of democratic politics in 
that country (Alden and Anseuuw 2009).  The establishment of an opposition party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which drew its support primarily from the trade 
unions, urban professionals and the white farming community, challenged the decision by the 
Zimbabwean Peoples National Unity-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) to alter the constitution to 
entrench Robert Mugabe’s position as head of state. After losing considerable support to the 
MDC in parliamentary elections in June 2000, Mugabe reignited the national debate on land 
as a way of reinvigorating support from Zanu-PF’s traditional rural constituency.  Political 
violence instigated by Zanu-PF supporters with the complicity of the police was initially 
aimed at ousting white commercial farmers from the land, but spilled over into the run-up to 
the presidential elections in 2002.  These actions included systemic disruption of opposition 
campaigning, a voter-registration process riddled with fraud, intimidation and even murder of 
opposition candidates and their supporters (International Crisis Group 2004). The 
Zimbabwean government earned a sharp condemnation from the US, Australia and the EU. 
 
For ex-settler states like South Africa and Namibia, which shared many of the same domestic 
characteristics found in Zimbabwe, the crisis in Zimbabwe raised deeply uncomfortable 
questions about the conduct and commitment of the ruling parties in fulfilling liberation-era 
promises.  Indeed, in South Africa over 84 percent of agricultural land remained in the hands 
of white owners, leaving the apartheid-era land ownership patterns virtually unchanged. 
Between 1994 and 1999 only 5,000 of the estimated 63,500 land-restitution claims had been 
settled by the government. In neighbouring Namibia, where 3,800 white commercial farmers 
owned 80 percent of the arable land, just as little progress had also been made on agrarian 
reform.  By 2001, only 97 commercial farms (totalling 568,821 hectares) had been acquired 
for resettlement and 1,964 black families resettled (Alden and Anseeuw 2009).  For other 
SADC countries, the powerful anti-imperial message conveyed by Mugabe evoked the 
regional solidarity campaigns of the recent past (Philminster and Raftopoulos 2005). 
 
The result was that the South African government – widely expected by the West to take up a 
critical stance against the violations of basic democratic practice by Harare given its own 
democratic credentials – acted with a curious mix of timidity, equivocation and support for 
the Zimbabwean government’s actions.  Other SADC states were hardly different in their 
approach to the issues, with the notable exception of Botswana, and either explicitly endorsed 
Mugabe’s position or remained conspicuously silent. Most importantly, the South African 
president, Thabo Mbeki, articulated a policy of constructive engagement (called ‘quiet 
diplomacy’), which sought to encourage Mugabe privately on the path to reform while 
publicly proclaiming support for his actions (Schoeman and Alden 2003). As Zimbabwe was 
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South Africa’s largest trading partner in Africa, Mbeki’s government argued that the 
imposition of economic sanctions would impose high costs on South African businesses 
operating there.  Moreover, there was serious concern that a destabilised Zimbabwe would 
ignite refugee flows and greater economic chaos across the region (Africa Institute 2001). 
Namibia, whose direct ties with the Zimbabwean economy were far fewer, nonetheless was 
linked through its close monetary and trade links to South Africa. Its president, Sam Nujoma, 
had a close personal relationship with Mugabe and this contributed to Namibia’s support for 
Zimbabwean intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998 (itself 
controversial and unauthorised by SADC).  
 
At the SADC level, despite differences behind the scenes, regional solidarity marked the 
collective response to the Zimbabwean crisis in its initial phase.  A meeting between Mugabe 
and the leaders of South Africa and Mozambique in April 2000 ended with Mbeki and 
Joaquim Chissano proclaiming solidarity with the Zimbabwean leader.  Nujoma was 
consistently supportive of Mugabe’s analysis of the origins of the crisis – colonial legacies 
and neo-imperialism – and the measures adopted by Zanu-PF to combat these factors.  This 
position began to change at the August 2001 SADC summit in Blantyre, which expressed 
concern at the effect the crisis was having on the region, and a SADC Task Team criticised 
Mugabe in October 2001 on failure to reinstate law and order.  Concurrently, SADC leaders 
sought to punish Mugabe by denying him expected senior positions within the organisation.  
At a press conference in November 2001, Mbeki acknowledged that the violence occurring in 
the build up to the Zimbabwean presidential elections would affect more than just 
perceptions, noting (Independent Online, May 29, 2001): ‘If you have elections which are not 
seen as legitimate by the people, you will have a situation that will be worse than the present 
one.’  The response of the Zimbabwean media to this most circumspect of public criticisms 
was devastatingly personal, accusing Mbeki of conspiring with the British government to 
unseat Mugabe and turn back the clock on liberation.  
 
During the build up to Zimbabwe’s presidential elections of March 2002, South African 
officials sought to address the issue in the regional SADC setting, the continental forum of the 
Organisation of African Unity, and internationally through the Commonwealth and the UN. 
Following the UN’s Millennium 2000 Summit, where Mbeki committed the government to 
play a role as intermediary between the international financial institutions and Zimbabwe at 
the behest of Kofi Annan, South African officials secured International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
support for a financial package to cover some of the costs of a land-redistribution programme 
envisaged at a 1998 UN Development Programme conference. Britain itself was induced to 
pledge US$57 million towards the process, but again the agreement fell apart as Harare 
refused to be moved on the issue of ‘law and order’ and transparency. There was a last effort 
to resolve the land question in advance of the Zimbabwean presidential elections at a meeting 
in Abuja, Nigeria in September 2001 under the auspices of the Commonwealth Ministerial 
Action Group, which promised British financial support for land reform and its results were 
swiftly endorsed by five SADC presidents. 
 
At the same time, Mugabe began to speak openly at SADC summits of mobilising the black 
population of neighbouring states to launch their own land occupations of white-owned 
commercial farms, raising the spectacle of economic disruption and political strife across the 
region. His most notable articulation of this was his vitriolic attack on the British government 
in front of world leaders at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 
in 2002. Mugabe himself instigated, to thundering applause, the most memorable attack on 
Blair at that gathering (Telegraph, September 3, 2002): 
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‘We are not Europeans.  We have not asked for an inch of Europe, any square 
inch of that territory. So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my 
Zimbabwe.’ 
The Chief of Zimbabwe’s Defence Force, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, openly declared he 
would not be willing to serve under a president who had not been part of the liberation 
struggle, a position criticised by SADC leaders (Human Rights Watch 2005). The rapturous 
receptions Mugabe and other top Zanu-PF officials received at gatherings around the region, 
including in South Africa and Namibia, underscored his growing popularity with African 
audiences.4 
 
The ramifications of the Zimbabwean crisis for the domestic situation in the former settler 
states were considerable (Lahiff and Cousins 2001). Land activists, from the Transkei Land 
Services Organisation to the Landless Peoples Movement in South Africa to Namibian NGO 
and trade unionists, used the spectacle in Zimbabwe to raise questions about the continuing 
inequities in land distribution in their countries. Many regional NGOs, who responded with a 
critical review of their own situations to Moyo’s comments criticising their inaction (cited in 
Mwengo 1999: 7), moved to embrace a more aggressive public stance on the topic in future. 
New measures that they committed themselves to included ‘stimulating a faster pace of land 
reforms by exerting pressure on government and policy makers’ as well as ‘influencing 
donors and other foreign interests to support land reform and redistribution processes’ 
(Mwengo 1999: 42). In Namibia, the Namibian National Farmers Union (NFFU), the 
Namibian NGO Forum (Nangof) and the National Union of Namibian Workers organised a 
march on parliament to protest about the slow pace of land reform as well as their exclusion 
from consultation on proposed legislation on communal land rights (The Namibian, 
September 8, 1999). After a visit to Zimbabwe in April 2000, the NNFU and Nangof were 
able to call upon the Zimbabwean experience as a stark warning to the government and the 
white commercial farmers that land reform was imperative to stability in Namibia, declaring 
(NNFU Nangof press statement, May 24, 2000): ‘Let us keep in mind that today is Zimbabwe 
and tomorrow could be Namibia.’ 
 
This heightening of domestic tensions over the land issue played into Mugabe’s hands, 
putting the South African government on the defensive, denying the failure of its land reform 
programmes to address inequalities inherited from the past and emphasising the importance of 
retaining the constitutional guarantees on property. In South Africa, where the reaction to the 
Zimbabwean crisis had been more divided, growing pressure within the ANC to take a harder 
line against Mugabe had been a feature of the public debate since the middle of 2000.5  But, at 
the same time, contrary expressions of support within the party were much in evidence. For 
example, Kgalema Motlanthe, ANC Secretary General, declared that Zimbabwe’s land 
occupations were a ‘protest action’ and that the land imbalance in that country was ‘immoral’ 
(cited in Lahiff and Cousins 2001: 655). The popularity of Zanu-PF amongst ANC party rank 
and file was clearly illustrated by the cheers that greeted Emmerson Mnangagwa, at that time 
Mugabe chosen successor, at the annual ANC party congress in 2002 (Main and Guardian, 
April 26, 2003). At the same time, the composition of the MDC, led by black trade unionists 
and white agricultural interests, mirrored in broad terms (potentially) discontented factions 
within South Africa’s own political landscape: there was a visceral reaction within ANC 
                                                 
4 For instance, Mashabela (2002) declared at the WSSD summit that Mugabe was ‘speaking for black people 
worldwide’. 
5 The ANC’s alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist 
Party, became increasingly vocal in their criticism of spiral of violence and attacks on Zimbabwean trade unions 
and the media. 
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circles against legitimising the MDC over the interests of a fellow liberation movement. By 
2004, however, the ANC had acknowledged the shortcomings of the market-based approach 
to reform, a key component of the historic compromise that ushered in the transition to 
democracy. In South Africa, Mbeki committed to transforming black ownership of farmland 
to 30 percent of all land by 2015 and increased the finances available to the Department of 
Land Affairs to purchase farms as well as the legal tools to speed up expropriation.  In 
Namibia, despite inflammatory language by Nujoma, the emphasis on due process was 
continually underscored by the government as it sought to resettle the estimated 240,000 
landless Namibians. 
 
The international reaction to the presidential elections in Zimbabwe in 2002 and the 
atmosphere of violence and intimidation that preceded them was divided.  The electoral 
observers from regional states in Southern Africa declared the poll to be ‘free and fair’, 
though the SADC parliamentary electoral observers broke with this position saying (SADC 
Parliamentary Forum 2002: 12): 
‘The climate of insecurity obtaining in Zimbabwe since the 2000 parliamentary 
elections was such that the electoral process could not be said to adequately 
comply wit the Norms and Standards of Elections in the SADC region’.    
So too did the Commonwealth Observer Mission, led by Nigerian General Abjulsalami 
Abubakar, which stated that ‘the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for a free 
expression of will by the electors’ and advocated an ‘appropriate Commonwealth response’ 
(International Crisis Group 2004).  The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held 
in London in the aftermath of the Zimbabwean election voted for a year’s suspension.  A 
reluctant Mbeki joined Nigerian president Olusen Obasanjo and Australia’s John Howard in 
forming the ‘Troika’ of states who were to review and report on the Zimbabwean 
government’s progress in meeting the Commonwealth’s expressed concerns in the coming 
year. At the Commonwealth summit held in Abuja, Mugabe’s anger at the unwillingness to 
rescind its suspension and, concurrently, the failure of South African-led attempts to organise 
a removal of its head, Don MacKinnon, finally caused the Zimbabwean president to 
withdrawal the country permanently from the organisation in December 2003.    
 
By 2004, with an estimated four hundred farms left in the hands of whites and reportedly 
several hundred of their families residing in the cities, the land issue had largely receded into 
the background of the Zimbabwean crisis. In its stead was a naked contest for political power, 
played out both within Zanu-PF and its opponents, the MDC.  In the winter of 2005, acting in 
advance of parliamentary elections, a security operation code named ‘Operation 
Murambatsvina’ − designed to rid Harare’s outlying areas of MDC supporters − was 
launched, bulldozing houses and informal settlements and leaving an estimated 18,000 people 
without shelter.  The government’s electoral victory was widely condemned by Western 
countries for its overt violence and intimidation of the MDC, but endorsed by South Africa 
and the African Union. The MDC itself split into two factions, one wing associated with 
Tsvangirai and a smaller group headed by Arthur Mutambara, over a decision not to 
participate in the newly formed Senate.  During this period, the economic hardships facing the 
country continued to escalate, with life expectancy falling from 60 years in 1990 to 37 years 
in 2006.  The economy itself steadily lost ground, shrinking at a rate of over 10 percent from 
2002 onwards, unemployment estimated at 80 percent and its currency experiencing 
hyperinflation to the point where the Reserve Bank had to issue a new Z$100 trillion note in 
January 2009.  Starvation and hunger directly effecting at least three million people stalked 
the country. 
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Remarkably, despite these terribly adverse conditions facing much of the country, the ability 
of Mugabe’s government to mobilise support both within Zimbabwe and, most importantly, 
in the rest of Africa remained largely intact. Within Zimbabwe, the strategic use of dwindling 
resources and party loyalties, alongside direct intimidation and fear, continued to deliver 
support from traditional leaders and amongst the rural communities. At the same time, by 
continuing to decry British and US interference in Zimbabwean affairs, Mugabe ensured that 
South Africa and to a large extent SADC itself treated his government’s trespasses of 
democracy and economic problems with kid gloves. The application of sanctions by the IMF 
− a largely meaningless act in light of Zimbabwe’s inability to meet its interest payments − 
coupled to targeted sanctions against top Zanu-PF officials and their families by Washington, 
Brussels and their allies, provided the necessary ‘proof’ of Western complicity in a 
conspiracy to overturn the liberation. Mugabe’s efforts to seek alternative sources of support 
through his ‘Look East’ policy launched in 2003 secured diplomatic support from China, 
critical in blocking action at the UN Security Council, but this did not translate into much 
more than promises of financial investment.  
 
However, patience within governing circles in Pretoria had begun to thin, especially after 
Harare kicked out a Cosatu delegation in 2007; and, as conditions deteriorated within 
Zimbabwe, tens of thousands of refugees began to stream over the border into neighbouring 
countries.  South African efforts to mediate disputes in advance of the joint presidential and 
parliamentary elections in March 2008 resulted in the promulgation in Zimbabwe of a SADC 
commitment to new accountable standards for electoral contests.  The result was a clear 
victory for the newly reunited MDC in parliament and (though disputed by a shocked Zanu-
PF) a victory for Morgan Tsvangirai. At the G8 summit in Hokkaido three months later, 
Mbeki was subjected to public criticism by the US President and British Prime Minister for 
his defence of Mugabe; and, subsequently, they tabled a resolution at the UN Security 
Council condemning the Zimbabwean governments’ failure to abide by the results of the 
elections.  A veto by China and Russia thwarted the resolution, but active pressure applied by 
China and South Africa on Mugabe − the former state indicating that they would not block 
future resolutions − finally brought Mugabe into direct talks with Tsvangirai.  Though 
protracted, the discussions produced a joint commitment to work together in a government of 
national unity.  Predictably, the SADC mediation in late 2008 tilted towards Mugabe and 
forced Tsvangirai and his party to accept a secondary role as prime minister in a unity 
government under the Zanu-PF leader in January 2009.    
 
 
ASEAN and Myanmar 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines against a backdrop of decades of domestic 
and regional turmoil. The key pillars of the organisation were a commitment to a classic 
interpretation of the sovereignty principle and a desire to minimise what were seen to be 
destabilising forms of external involvement in the region. The organisation evolved gradually, 
assuming a greater official role through the establishment of the Secretariat at the Jakarta 
Summit in 1976, as well as expanding its involvement in the economic development of the 
region.  These economic initiatives, which produced only modest growth in intra-regional 
trade, were given a further boost in 1992 with the commitment to establish an ASEAN Free 
Trade Area, which became operational in 2003. Security co-operation in the form of 
confidence-building measures and frequent multilateral and track two meetings were adopted 
and frequently employed by ASEAN. These endeavours were linked to a host of initiatives, 
including the launching of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, which put the organisation at 
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the centre of some of the most contentious regional security issues.  Through a continual 
series of meetings at ministerial levels, punctuated by annual summits involving ASEAN 
leaders, the organisation has developed an orchestrated form of regularised diplomacy that 
aims at, and to some extent has achieved, the building of greater regional cohesion (Simon 
2008).  At the same time, a process of expansion of ASEAN membership brought Vietnam 
into the organisation in 1995, followed by the decision to include Laos and Myanmar in 1997, 
and finally (after a two-year delay) Cambodia in 1999, putting the organisation at its current 
complement of ten states.6   
 
ASEAN diplomacy has centred on the founding ideals encapsulated in the Treaty of Amity 
and Co-operation, which enshrined sovereignty and non-interference as the bedrock of the 
institution, and the subsequent call for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in 1971, 
which decried external interference in the region. These regional norms provided the moral 
authority for ASEAN to take a lead role in what is arguably its most successful diplomatic 
initiative, the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from war-torn Cambodia in 1992.  Post-Cold 
War diplomacy has focused on developing approaches to managing – if not resolving – a 
range of pressing regional security issues with intra- and extra-regional dimensions, such as 
the competing claims over the resource-rich South China Sea.  An innovative response to the 
power asymmetry between the organisation and the key international actors in the region – 
the US, China, India and the EU – prompted the creation of the ‘dialogue partner’ process.  In 
stylistic terms, the organisation’s perchance for informal, elite-based interaction came to be 
known as the ‘ASEAN way’.  This approach held that private diplomacy was preferable to its 
public form – which was not only seen to be culturally offensive but often counter-productive 
– as a means of addressing problems between members. 
 
Myanmar, the country once known as Burma (and still called that by pro-democracy 
activists), is the organisation’s most vexing contemporary problem in the post-Cold War era.  
The rise of anti-government protests in 1988, despite thousands being killed in the ensuing 
crackdown, brought about the collapse of the isolationist regime of Ne Win and led to a 
military take-over.  The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) held elections in 
May 1990 in pursuit of external legitimacy (Steinberg 2007: 136) and, much to the shock of 
the presiding military junta, Aung Sung Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) 
won 392 out of the 489 seats being contested.  The SLORC nullified the results, banned the 
NLD and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest. Despite a tide of domestic and Western protests, 
the SLORC continued its suppression of the NLD and its supporters. General Than Shwe 
launched the National Convention in 1993, a putative all-party process – which periodically 
banned the participation of the NLD representatives – whose aim was to develop a new 
constitution. By July 1995, the military junta released Suu Kyi and a process of dialogue with 
the UN Secretary General’s special envoys commenced, complemented by preliminary 
discussions with ASEAN over ascension.  This was cut short when Suu Kyi was re-arrested 
and the National Convention was suspended a year later. 
 
Seeking a way out of the impasse, the military junta established the ruling State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, replacing the SLORC but nonetheless retaining a 
heavy military dominance. The aim of this move was to pave the way for stability and the 
rehabilitation of Myanmar (as the country was now called) back into international 
community.  It was on this basis that Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, with the SPDC 
having given assurances to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed that this 
                                                 
6 Brunei was admitted to ASEAN in 1984. 
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represented a move towards a form of democracy.  According to scholars, the expectation at 
the time was that the military would adopt a version of Indonesia’s ‘guided democracy’, 
where the military had a statutory role in decision making since the 1965 coup.  The collapse 
of Suharto’s regime in mid-1998 rendered that idea temporarily stillborn and Myanmar 
continued on its uncertain path of military rule through that SPDC and under the spotlight of 
sustained Western criticism.  
 
Though the decision to bring Myanmar into the regional organisation generated a measure of 
controversy within ASEAN, it became more acute as the years passed and the internal 
situation continued to generate negative publicity and problems. At the regional level, the 
combination of illegal drugs and human trafficking into Thailand as well as refugee flows out 
of Myanmar impacted on that country in particular, exacerbated by occasional military 
skirmishes on their common border (Ganesan 2006).  By 1998, the Thai government proposed 
the adoption of a new form of public diplomacy towards Myanmar characterised as ‘flexible 
engagement’.  Resisted by the SPDC with the support of Vietnam, a watered-down version of 
‘enhanced interaction’ was adopted instead (Simon 2008: 272).  In June 2003, in the wake of 
the unrest at Depayin the previous month that cost the lives of four members of the NLD and 
brought about a renewed detention of the Nobel Prize winner, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
meeting took their first public stance.  Sharp exchanges were alleged to have passed between 
some ASEAN leaders and the Myanmar foreign minister, Khin Nyunt, and the final 
communiqué broke new ground in publicly calling on Myanmar’s government to demonstrate 
progress towards a ‘peaceful transition to democracy’  (Haacke 2006: 192).   
 
In the wake of rising tensions between ASEAN and Myanmar a number of diplomatic 
initiatives were mooted to break the deadlock.  Indonesia proposed the convening of an 
‘ASEAN Troika’ (an innovation created in 2000 to handle sensitive issues with regional 
political and security implications), but this was rejected by the SPDC (Ganesan 2006: 142).  
Mahathir suggested darkly that, in the absence of moves towards democratisation, Myanmar 
would be expelled from ASEAN ‘as a last resort’.  A newly-elected Thai government put 
forward the idea of a ‘road map’ in 2003 with the ultimate aim of finding a way of releasing 
the NLD’s leader and holding free elections to which the SPDC responded with the seven-
step ‘road map’ of its own (Ganesan 2006: 140-1;). This so-called ‘Bangkok process’ had the 
support of key member states like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. 
However, the sudden removal of Khin Nyunt (who was viewed as a moderate within the 
military junta in Myanmar) in advance of the ASEAN Summit in 2004 proved to be a major 
setback and, despite the fact that no mention was made of the situation in Myanmar in the 
proceeding and final communiqués of the subsequent ASEAN Summit in 2004, the military – 
seemingly in defiance of ASEAN – extended Suu Kyi’s house arrest for another year.  The 
UN Special Envoy, a Malaysian diplomat named Razali Ismail, gave up trying to win Suu 
Kyi’s release by late 2004, when he was no longer welcome in the country.   
 
Throughout this period, the US, European states and Japan exerted pressure on the 
government of Myanmar to varying degrees. The US initially imposed wide-ranging 
sanctions after the military takeover in 1988 and the junta’s subsequent decision to scuttle the 
1990 elections, while the EU introduced selective trade and arms embargoes as well as 
restrictions on investment and aid.  In December 2005, the US and Britain sponsored an 
informal consultation about conditions in Myanmar at the UN Security Council, followed by 
a decision to allow Myanmar to become a formal part of the UN Security Council agenda in 
2006.  For its part Japan maintained a closer association with the regime but kept restrictions 
on their foreign aid in place since 1988; these were further reduced after the Depayin incident 
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in 2003 . Ironically, the structured forms of diplomatic engagement, namely the dialogue-
partnership process – which sought to turn the asymmetric ties with major foreign powers into 
a form of ‘enmeshment’ – provided a platform at these annual gatherings for ritualised 
condemnation of Myanmar and pressure on ASEAN by the US and the EU.  Pro-democracy 
activists in the West have pushed for compliance by Western companies through boycotts and 
lawsuits, while UN agencies like the International Labour Organisation took legal action at 
the International Court of Justice in November 2006 against the military junta, claiming that 
tens of thousands of Burmese were subject to forced labour.  The UN General Assembly, 
responding to the annual reports submitted by the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission 
of Human Rights for Myanmar, passed resolutions in 2006 condemning the violation of 
human rights there.   
 
At the same time, with the advent of sanctions and boycotts by the West, the military junta 
looked to China for diplomatic, military and economic support.  The suspension of Beijing’s 
support for the Burmese Communist Party in 1995, one of the more effective insurgency 
groups active in Myanmar, coupled to the onset of major investments in infrastructure and the 
energy sphere, produced important economic and diplomatic dividends for the junta (Haacke 
2006: 25-33).  After 1995, the SPDC sought to diversify its economic partners to include 
India and has been rewarded with loans and investments in its energy sector as well as 
diplomatic backing at the UN (Haacke 2006: 33-8).  ASEAN members have provided some 
direct investment but, partly due to the negative impact of the 1997 Asian economic crisis on 
the region, this fell far short of the SPDC’s expectations. 
 
At the same time, developments within ASEAN added additional impetus to the pressure 
being directed at Myanmar.  In December 2005, the decision was taken to establish a formal 
legal entity through the promulgation of the ASEAN Charter, which included a strong 
endorsement of human rights and democracy. The ensuing debate over the use of sanctions 
against member states that violated ASEAN declarations and agreements resulted in a 
modification of the sanctions provisions. Nonetheless, in this contentious climate, ASEAN 
members were able to convince Myanmar not to take up the rotational chairmanship of the 
organisation to avoid the spectacle of public condemnation (and the possibility of a boycott) 
by its Western dialogue partners (Gansen 2006: 132). The Charter was formally adopted in 
November 2007 and though sceptics have pointed out that ‘human rights remains subordinate 
to the Association’s bedrock principle of non-interference’, it is clear it reflects changing 
attitudes across Southeast Asia (Simon 2008: 278). Concurrently, the chorus of ASEAN 
government, parliamentary and civil society voices openly critical of the situation in 
Myanmar grows louder. For instance, the establishment of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Myanmar Caucus to promote the democratisation process in that country noted the negative 
image the situation had on the organisation (Gansen 2006: 142). Since 2007, when the 
Myanmar issue proved to be divisive at the annual ASEAN Summit, key member states have 
indicated that they were no longer willing to defend Myanmar at international gatherings.  
 
In the meantime, tensions arose again within Myanmar with another series of massive 
protests, this time in response to rising fuel prices and led by Buddhist monks in September 
2007, culminating in a severe military crackdown. The veto by China and Russia of a UN 
Security Council draft resolution condemning the Myanmar government (itself tacitly 
supported by an Indonesian abstention) signalled the continued unwillingness of ASEAN to 
provide diplomatic cover.  The military junta’s decision to hold a national referendum on the 
proposed constitution coincided with a destructive typhoon that struck on May 3, 2008, 
leaving an estimated 200,000 people dead or missing and up to one million homeless.  Initial 
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relief efforts presented in terms that invoked the ‘responsibility to protect’ by the international 
community, including the US military, were rejected by the military junta.  Ultimately 
ASEAN states were able to facilitate the delivery of limited provisions for humanitarian 
assistance, but not without forestalling another round of international criticism. In the wake of 
this, the completion of the lengthy constitutional referendum process coincided with an 
Indonesian-led initiative to involve the UN, China and India directly in discussions on the 
emerging political transition. (Haacke 2008: 162-3)  Despite a public declaration by ASEAN 
foreign ministers in July 2009 urging the military junta to release all political prisoners, 
including Aung San Suu Kyi, so as to allow them to participate in upcoming 2010 elections, 
the government refused to budge.7  
 
 
SADC and ASEAN and the Limits of Regional Responses to Internal ‘Pariahs’ 
This comparative study of regional organisations provides a template for understanding the 
policy choices and actions undertaken by these organisations and their member states in 
response to external pressure on internal ‘pariahs’.  Moreover, it helps to delineate the reasons 
for the gap between the expectations that Western-dominated international institutions have of 
regional organisations as local managers of security and the operating assumptions that guide 
these regional organisations, as well as the actual local conditions as determinants of policy 
outcomes.   
 
The overriding assumption of the literature on evolving forms of global governance is a linear 
one, with international policies being derived from recognised international norms, founded 
on the UN Charter and past precedents (Falk 1999: 241-2).  Regional organisations are 
situated in this depiction of the international hierarchy as local implementing agents, not as 
local interpreters of international norms.  Local actors, meaning governments, are essentially 
held to be passive recipients of ideas and practices without significant local agency over them. 
They owe their position as intermediary inter-governmental bodies within the international 
system by virtue of the fact that member states are part of the UN, are therefore signatories to 
key documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and, in terms of Chapter 
VIII, recognised as having a statutory (if not spelled out by the Charter) role within the 
international system.  Indeed, the operating assumptions of the key notion underpinning this 
particular account of global governance is ‘subsidiarity’, which, after all, is a terminology 
derived from the Catholic Church.  The scope of bishoprics for independent interpretation and 
action may vary somewhat, but ultimately doctrine is made at the centre (the Papacy) and 
their respective positions are legitimised by this same centre with its unique confluence of 
ideational and material power.   
 
This common assessment of the sources of legitimacy for regional organisations is a 
fundamental misreading of the situation.  Regional organisations were founded not as 
instruments for the conveyance and enforcement of international directives or ideas but rather 
as, first and foremost, bulwarks of local politics against external forces – be they great power 
ambitions or the various (economic, political and ideological) forces of internationalism 
(Tavares 2007: 5). The primary function they serve is therefore to ensure the survival of the 
state, sometimes defined as leader or regime interests, and which is best done by supporting 
its continued legitimacy. In those cases where a regional power is a source of concern, for 
instance South Africa or India, strategies of state survival encompass ‘enmeshment’ into 
regional arrangements such that their preponderance of material capabilities is checked by 
                                                 
7 A position solidified by the quixotic actions of  a US ‘supporter’ who illegally gained entry to Suu Kyi’s home. 
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established norms and practices within the regional organisation.  External polices and events 
are measured against their impact on these core values of sovereignty and legitimacy. 
Rhetoric notwithstanding, regional organisations are only secondly seen by member states as 
sites for pursuing co-operative strategies in other areas like enhancing intra-regional trade.  
Indeed, the obvious resistance to substantive expansion of these economic pursuits, reflected 
for instance in the unwillingness to implement trade protocols, underscores the instinctive 
need to preserve intact sovereignty as the key source of regime legitimacy.  Even when it 
comes to responding to externally-generated ideas, regional organisations exert a mediating 
function, ensuring that these are absorbed (or discarded) in ways that correspond to, and 
reinforce, prevailing forms of government (Acharya 2004). 
 
Behind the misreading of regional organisations is a notable ahistorical interpretation. Part of 
the problem resides in the post-Cold War scholarship on regional organisations, which in the 
main has ignored complex questions of their role in respect to regional security and stability.  
In particular, the literature on ‘new regionalism’ − which focuses on regional organisations 
solely as economic entities responding to the challenges of globalisation − provides limited 
insight (indeed seems to suffer a loss of historical memory in this regard) into the formative 
political forces that compelled states to establish them in the first place (Grugel and Hout 
1999). By stripping away the primary political purpose that gave rise to regional 
organisations, scholars have reduced any potential understanding of guiding norms, structures 
of accountability and modes of decision making and the reasons that these endure into the 
present day. These were, as outlined above, rooted in fundamental concerns of state (and 
regime) security, embracing the principle of sovereignty as a source of legitimacy and as an 
instrument for nation building.  For instance, an organisation like ASEAN, whose 
commitment to genuinely strengthening intra-regional trade was only ever partially realised in 
the last decade, cannot be adequately understood if seen as primarily an instrument for 
furthering trade and investment, as many scholars persist in doing. The choices pursued 
reference the effect that any policies have on the maintenance of ASEAN’s core values.  So 
too an excessive emphasis on the economic development aims of SADC, boosted by treaty 
commitments and other public declarations, glosses over the overriding concerns of political 
actors who seek legitimacy and stability in the face of tremendous domestic and external 
challenges. The security dimension for both organisations is deeply ingrained in their 
approach to sovereignty in general, their intra-regional relations and most especially in how 
they respond to the external environment outside the region.   
 
Reaffirming the historical trajectory of forms of regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern 
Africa provides a means of understanding the contemporary configurations and the 
accompanying policy choices in place within these regional organisations. The role of path 
dependency in shaping institutional formations, notably the constraining role played by 
decades of Cold War politics in Southeast Asia (Beeson 2004: 14) and Southern Africa (Lee 
1989; Nathan 2004a, 2004b), remain significant to today’s politics. As Kuhonta (2006: 339) 
notes, ‘ASEAN’s intense preoccupation with sovereignty should be understood within the 
context of state formation in the post-colonial world’. Nathan (2004a: 18) echoes this position 
when he declares that the ‘political, economic and administrative weakness of SADC weak 
states has hindered the creation of a viable security regime’.  Scholars have gone further to 
suggest that ASEAN is – and one could incorporate SADC as well – fundamentally an 
‘illiberal security community’.  As Kuhonta (2006: 342) notes: 
‘It is this mix of legal-rational and socio-cultural norms that provides the glue 
binding the ASEAN states together.  Liberalism is conspicuously absent in the 
building blocks of ASEAN’s security community.’  
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Drawing from Nathan’s work on SADC and values, shared regional norms on the 
inviolability of sovereignty dominate the discourse and practices of SADC, producing a 
similar tendency towards an illiberal security community (Nathan 2004a: 19), but one that 
nonetheless adheres broadly to the electoral practices that brought about majoritarian rule.  
 
Complicating the picture further is a scholarly and policy-making focus on regional hegemons 
as potential leaders within regional organisations. Though they hold more material power and 
can even derive further legitimacy from external sources, the fact is that their position within 
their respective region is nearly always contested.  Regional hegemons are from this 
perspective largely captives of their organisations, at least when it comes to problems defined 
by external actors as matters of international consequence.  In order to conduct successful 
policies towards their regions, regional hegemons have to engage the member states through 
regional organisations that are explicitly designed to counter dominance by any one state.  As 
such, putative regional hegemons endanger their standing within both regions and regional 
organisations when they respond too readily to external pressures. The impulse towards unity 
is built into the very structures of the organisation, from the horizontal forms of 
accountability, the role of legitimisation of other states and the very decision-making process.  
All of this, then, puts the focus back on the regional organisation as the key actor and the 
accompanying structures, processes and underlying values that inform its approach.   
 
In the cases of SADC and ASEAN outlined above, the Western implication of a particular 
member state as a ‘pariah’, though constituted in terms of its failure to abide by accepted 
international norms – even when those norms are accepted by individual member states and 
codified into region-wide policies – takes little cognisance of the founding values and 
established practices of the regional organisation in question.  Believing that regional 
organisations like SADC and ASEAN are constituted as intermediaries within the 
international system, Western governments have sought to use pressure – in the first instance 
moral suasion but increasingly coupled to punitive diplomatic and economic sanctions against 
targeted regimes in Zimbabwe and Myanmar – to ensure compliance with what are seen to be 
accepted international norms and practices. The failure to recognise that these regional 
organisations’ raison d’être is the security of its member states, defined as resisting forms of 
external (and intra-regional) interference that challenge the legitimacy of any one of its 
members, has meant that Western governments misread the possibility of producing change 
through them.  Recourse to regional hegemons like South Africa does nothing to alter this 
equation.   
 
Under these circumstances, the pre-eminence of domestic and regional concerns over that of 
international issues is a natural policy response amongst the member states of regional 
organisations. What this has meant is that in both the cases of SADC and ASEAN, attempts to 
pressure them to join external actors in treating one of their member states as a ‘pariah’ were 
very likely to produce not compliance but regional unity of resistance.  When, however, 
member states recognise that public support for Western-designated pariahs is incurring costs 
to their own legitimacy or that of their regional organisations, they will seek to use the 
established structures of accountability to exert their own forms of pressure on these regimes 
to modify their conduct.  Such localised efforts at ‘behaviour modification’ are nonetheless 
framed within the concerns of maintaining the public appearance of regional unity and remain 
subject to the overriding impulse to guard sovereignty.  For this reason these are unlikely to 
produce dramatic changes in behaviour, as has been demonstrated by the cases of Zimbabwe 
and Myanmar.   
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At the same time, as is evident from the two case studies, though the historical processes have 
structured and conditioned these regional organisations towards a sovereignty bias, it would 
be a mistake to view their sources of legitimacy or even view regional organisations 
themselves as static. Indeed, in the realm of ideas, arguably the most potent force for change, 
both SADC and ASEAN provide cogent examples of differing forms of adaptation to 
changing or new norms and patterns of enforcement of these norms. SADC, for instance, 
provides an illustration of how its commitment to majoritarian rule nurtured during the anti-
colonial and anti-apartheid struggle evolved into a regional norm mandating electorally-based 
forms of change of government that serves as a crucial basis for recognition and legitimacy 
within the region. The willingness to suspend member states that blatantly violate this 
principle, such as the regime in Madagascar in 2008, confirms this fundamental position.  At 
the same time, the liberation narrative that promotes the idea that authentic independence is 
synonymous with government by liberation movement-cum-party produces a cross-cutting 
norm within the region (Alden and Anseeuw 2009; Dorman 2006).  In this regard it is 
instructive that Mugabe, while violating much of the spirit of democracy during various 
electoral campaigns, nonetheless continued to adhere to elections so as not to alienate SADC 
and invoke punitive action.  Supporting this has been Mugabe’s skilful use of the horizontal 
and vertical structures of accountability founded on liberation movement-cum-party links as 
an additional source of regional legitimacy – which dominate in South Africa, Namibia, 
Mozambique and Angola – and have strengthened his claim to power.  
 
In the case of ASEAN, new ideas about the desirability of seeking legitimacy through 
democracy have increasingly taken hold amongst member states over the years, culminating 
in the promotion of the ASEAN Charter process with its more explicit commitment to 
democratic principles. However, while some Southeast Asian states may find elections to be a 
new source of legitimacy, the fact that ASEAN accepted authoritarian states into its 
membership within the last decade limits the possibilities of extending that idea into a 
regional norm. The enduring strength of the non-interference principle coupled to the 
operating mode of consensus decision making continues to undercut efforts to broaden the 
basis of regional legitimacy. This was further demonstrated by the purging of punitive 
measures, such as suspension of membership from earlier versions of the Charter. The result 
has been that member states that sought to distance themselves from Myanmar could do no 
more than declaim their dissatisfaction as individual states or through the mechanism of the 
regional diplomatic censure. 
 
Comparing the two cases, it seems that the conformity of political purpose that featured in the 
long anti-colonial/anti-apartheid struggle in Southern African and allowed radicals and 
liberals, statists and non-state actors to share a common aim has carried over into the post-
independence period.  The controversy in Zimbabwe is not about democracy as such, but 
rather the right of liberation movements to claim an enduring political status by virtue of their 
historical role in rooting out colonialism.  In the case of ASEAN, the strong imprint of ethno-
nationalism and its formative role in state formation, coupled to the record of Cold War 
intervention in the region, produced distinctively autonomous regimes within the states of the 
region whose suspicions of each other were only transcended by fears of external power 
intentions.  Nevertheless, in both the SADC and ASEAN, the spectre of external interference 
in regional affairs produces a residual closing of ranks that is deeply encoded in the 
historically-conditioned regional structures, rendering regional organisations ineffective 
managers for ‘pariahs’ within their midst.  
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Conclusion 
As this paper has shown, the challenges confronting regional organisations in managing the 
countervailing dynamics of Western-designated ‘pariahs’ and their formative concerns about 
sovereignty determine the levels and degree of their responsiveness.  Where regional 
organisations have acted to criticise these offending member states, it is when inaction has 
reached a point where their own legitimacy is in some way affected.  Far from representing 
any significant shift in regional outlook, such responses have remained framed by concerns 
around classic interpretations of sovereignty rather than reflecting any embrace of emerging 
international norms on sovereign responsibility.     
 
This relatively tepid response to externally-designated ‘pariahs’ is due in part to the 
overlapping and contrary interests that these regional organisations serve. At the same time, 
these problems stem from broader assumptions about the positioning of regional organisations 
within the global governance system effectively as intermediaries between international 
organisations and the spatial territory within which these regional organisations operate. 
Composed of states and established to serve their national interests, albeit through some form 
of mandated collective action, these regional organisations formulate norms and interpret 
rules that reflect the common perspectives of their members with regime survival and 
sovereignty as the cornerstone for action. At the same time, regional organisations are rooted 
in societies whose prevailing norms may or may not fully reflect the formative interests of the 
governing elites that convened and steer the regional organisation or, for that matter, those 
norms promoted by international organisations.  
 
Against this localised situation is the changing international dynamic on matters of 
sovereignty, democracy and human rights. Far from being static, international organisations 
themselves have undergone a partial transformation towards greater incorporation of 
democratic principles into the substance their work. Indeed, as the paper has shown the part 
played by international organisations, in particular the UN Security Council and its various 
agencies as well as the international financial institutions in regards to Western-designated 
‘pariah’ states, is much more complex than a simple reading would suggest.  The gradualist 
transformation of the UN system away from its rigid defence of sovereign principles to one 
that wrestles with the incorporation of democracy and human rights into its policies and 
practices is mirrored by the broadening of institutional concerns away from those dominated 
by the leading UN Security Council members.  Though prematurely deemed a failure by its 
leading proponents, the establishment of a UN Human Rights Council in 2006 was another 
mark of the seemingly inextricable march towards greater incorporation of democratic 
principles into the international organisation’s daily policies and practices.  
 
The result of this gradualist expansion of democratic norms at the level of global governance 
is that, while commonly seen to be a site for the defence of sovereignty by Western critics, 
too often – from the perspective of Western-designated ‘pariah’ states – the UN system is 
seen more as a potential threat to the very legitimacy of these regimes. As Haacke (2006: 95) 
points out in relation to Myanmar and the United Nations (but a statement that could equally 
apply to Zimbabwe):  
‘It would be a major historical irony if Myanmar, which joined the UN to better 
protect itself against threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, were to find 
that preventing UNSC (UN Security Council) involvement had become its 
primary foreign policy challenge.’  
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In this setting, regional organisations are seen to be a stronger bastion of sovereignty by 
targeted states than the UN.   
 
Finally, if regional organisations are not serving as interlocutors between the local and the 
established instruments of global governance, what function do they perform?  Indeed, one 
assessment that could be derived from this paper is that regional organisations are not 
meaningful to the management of local security matters.  Such a view would be misplaced. 
As noted earlier, regional organisations serve as legitimising agents through their role in 
formative events like membership accession and mutual recognition of local political actors 
and processes. They are inextricably involved in the maintenance of regional security but not 
on the terms set by the Western-dominated international institutions but rather in response to 
their own definitions and shared needs.  That these are sites where traditional concepts of 
sovereignty do ‘battle’ with progressive norms and practices is a marker of their significance 
as actors within the international system.  
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